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THE POSITION OF TURKEY  
INRELATION TO  
BRITISH INTERESTS IN INDIA  
BY THE REV. JAMES LONG

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
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
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
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# THE POSITION OF TURKEY

IN RELATION TO

# BRITISH INTERESTS IN INDIA.

A Paper Read

BEFORE

THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1875,

BY THE REV. JAMES LONG.

*(Fellow of the Association.)*

*Late of Calcutta*

LONDON:

EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, 20, GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
WESTMINSTER, S.W.

1876.

# EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

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## ABSTRACT OF THE PAPER.

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THE object of the paper is to present for *discussion*, in the form of queries, some *new* aspects of the Eastern Question in relation to India, viewed from an Anglo-Indian standpoint, and in connection with the interests of the Natives of that vast dependency of 240,000,000.

The following are the chief problems to be solved:—

That while the Press of England has recognized the advance of Russia in Central Asia as a measure necessary for her own development, called for by the needs of a growing empire, and beneficial in its civilizing effects, yet it is strongly felt that the contact of two great Empires involves the danger of collision—a contingency to be deprecated to the utmost, inasmuch as the real interests of both Empires, notwithstanding minor differences, are similar, and their influences over the down-trodden races of Asia are for good.

That Russia, as a rising Empire, requires a wide field for expansion abroad, and all efforts made to fix it within boundaries have been vain,—the pent-up energies must find a vent; but Central Asia, with its sparse population and few resources, does not afford an adequate sphere in this respect. The stream of Russian conquest now flows with full force in that direction, dashing up in its way against the Indian frontiers; it cannot be embanked, but it may be partially diverted. Does not Asia Minor present such a sphere of partial division, in accordance with the national aspirations of Russia, that regard the acquisition of Turkey as its manifest destiny?

That an European intervention in Turkey may be imminent; and should it lead to the protectorate of Asia Minor under Russia, would not, in such a case, the interests of British India demand the non-intervention of England in the arrangements to be made, on the following grounds: The benefits that would accrue to the *Native* races, who have for ages groaned under Turkish tyranny, as well as the advantages to England itself, as an American writer states: “Would not Turkey under Russian rule, under a development that should raise from the dead cities and centres and populations buried alive under Mahomedanism, be worth to England ten times its present value?”

The useful diversion it would give to the activity of Russia which is now directed on the comparatively barren tracts of Central Asia, in dangerous contiguity to the British frontier; whereas in Asia Minor full scope would be given for many years to Russia in developing the resources of a country once so fertile and populous.

In Central Asia, and on the Indian frontier, the two Empires are coming into close contact, risking a collision from the intrigues of Native chiefs and the jealousies of frontier officers, far away from England's base, where England has no allies, and no fleet can come. On the other hand, in Asia Minor, would not the stream of Russian conquest flow on until by extension it would lose its force and become a fertilizing stream, as has been the case with conquest in British India itself? Is it not safer, in the interests of European peace and of England itself, to have Russia in force in the Mediterranean than on the frontiers of Afghanistan?

England has shown her appreciation of India's interests in the late purchase of Suez Canal shares. The occupation of Asia Minor by Russia would not be likely for many years to interfere with the Canal; and would not the political progress of Russia in that direction be likely to be kept in check by the rival interests of Austria and Germany?

Would not the intervention by England with Russia in Turkey lead to the counter-check of Russia's interference with England in India—transferring the dispute from the Bosphorus to the frontiers of Afghanistan and Kashmir? Would not the extrusion of Russia from Turkey be her intrusion into India?

Does not the Russian advance to the neighbourhood of Herat render obsolete the old notion that Constantinople is the key to India, and that the integrity of Turkey is necessary to the safety of India? Leading Russian writers hold that the possession of Constantinople by Russia might endanger the unity of the Empire in ultimately transferring the seat of Government from the Neva to the Bosphorus.

1. The subject for discussion this afternoon is "The Position of Turkey in Relation to British Interests in India." The position of Turkey in relation to the European Powers has been taken up most fully by the Press through Europe; but the subject for this meeting has been little dwelt upon—viz.: In case of the probable occupation of Asia Minor by one of the Northern Powers sooner or later, with the consent of the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris, what might be the effect of this on English rule in India in relation to the 240,000,000 Natives in that vast dependency, including 40,000,000 Mahomedans,—on the position of Russia with 150,000 troops not far distant from the Indian frontiers, and on the communication between England and India *via* Egypt?

2. The Turkish or Eastern Question—a burning one—is gradually coming to the front, and the late happy measure of the English Government with regard to the Suez Canal will hasten the unfolding drama of the Eastern Question, and bring it to some kind of settlement. It involves, however, problems of the most serious and difficult character, which may task the highest powers of European statesmen to solve; and Mr. Disraeli has rung a warning note in the following remark, expressing the views of the leading political parties in England: "The interests of England in the settlement of the Turkish Question are not so direct as those of some Powers, but they were considerable, and they would be maintained; and if it became necessary to resort to a display of British power, that power would be displayed." He refers evidently to England as what he calls an Eastern Power; but, happily, he does not express the view that the integrity of Turkey is necessary to the safety of India. Constantinople may sink, while Calcutta may stand as erect as ever. Is Constantinople the key to India?

3. In the discussions on Turkey, Indian interests have been too much overlooked, as they were at the time of the Crimean War; and all I aim at now is to place certain facts and views before the public, not so much to express my individual views, but as queries, with the object of opening out a discussion, and so eliciting truth from the collision of

opinion. I am mainly led to this inquiry because these problems have been before me during a thirty years' residence in India, a two years' tour in Russia, and two visits paid to Turkey, and I am interested in these on moral and religious as well as political grounds, but the present discussion should obviously be based on the latter consideration. While there has been a deluge of literature on the Eastern Question, proposing all kinds of schemes, and reminding one of Molière's patient who died from the attendance of three physicians and two apothecaries, on the other hand India's interests have been seldom the standpoint, though the Central Asia Question, so vital for India, is linked with that of Turkey, and Anglo-Indians have a stake in Turkey as well as Turkish bondholders. The question relates to eventualities that may soon be actualities: matters are maturing much sooner than was expected; but forewarned ought to be forearmed.

#### THE CRISIS HAS CALLED FOR EUROPEAN INTERVENTION.

4. The death-knell of Turkey is sounding, bankruptcy indicates a political crash, while England sees now that her blood and treasure so freely spent for the upholding Turkey have been utterly wasted. Turkey has borrowed 200,000,000*l.* sterling in twenty years, and there is nothing substantial to show for it; her independence and integrity guaranteed by treaties the result of hard-fought battles, are a dream. The Crimean War, undertaken to support the Sick Man, has rather hastened his end; for twenty years new efforts have been made to improve Turkey, but they have ended in galvanizing a corpse; Turkey remains a mimicry of civilized life, a mere foreign garrison encamped in the fairest regions of the East.\*

Turkey stands now in the way; she is a menace to the peace of Europe. Could she have been reformed, it would have been a boon to herself and to humanity; but there is no hope of that, as a certain proverb expresses it, "Where the Turk treads the grass grows not." There is a varnish over

\* India has an ethnological interest in the Turkish or Tartar races; history depicts those tribes issuing from the plateau of Central Asia and pouring forth in two streams—one going west from the Altai, the Turkish one, and spreading ruin and devastation in its track, sweeping up to the walls of Vienna, leaving only traces of ruin behind; it stopped completely the overland trade, which had for ages been carried on from China and Central Asia, across the Black Sea, and through Constantinople, to Central Europe. The other stream, the Mogul, came to India, and has left behind it many glorious monuments and remains of civilization; while the former, the Turk, only pulled down and destroyed. It would be an insult to the memory of the mighty Akbar to compare him to Amurath or any Turkish Sultan.

Constantinople, but the irreclaimable savage of the Altai crops out from beneath. The reforms have been little better than shams—mere pretence: look at the Hatti-Sherif, or Edict of Toleration—it was scarcely ever carried out; yet, to blind the public, the original copy was deposited with the relics of the Prophet! Fifty years ago George Canning pronounced the Turkish Government a nuisance; that nuisance has now become offensive. The Mogul Government of Delhi passed away last century, its antitype is going this. The shadow of the Kaliphate is joining the shadow of the Great Mogul—both dreary—as phantoms of the past, albeit in their day they were styled the refuge of the world—the shadow of God on earth.

#### THE EUROPEAN POWER TO REPLACE TURKEY.

5. The present is a favourable time to discuss this question calmly. It was felt by various Anglo-Indians at the time of the Crimean War that India's interests were not regarded sufficiently on that occasion: hence Russia, shut up in a southerly direction, in consequence of the war, pushed on the eastern slope until she now hangs on the flanks of India. I merely refer to this very difficult question in order to introduce the main point, Who is to have the estate of the Turk, a now dying man? A Government in the hands of trustees ceases to be a Government, and foreigners are taking the helm which the Sick Man's feeble hand can no longer grasp firmly. *Greece* has put in a claim; but Greece is "living Greece no more," and can not manage even her own small territory. She is well described as a focus of intrigue, anarchy, and brigandage. The *Danubian Provinces* are too undeveloped themselves, and too anarchical, even to form by themselves a Confederate South Slav Government, much less to rule Turkey; though this is the age of great agglomerations, and they may have to form part of some greater government. *Austria* is a mosaic Power without cohesion, with tremendous difficulties lying in her own path from the majority of her subjects, who are Slavs, and who detest her because she has degraded them; she rules her Slav subjects like a man holding a bull-dog by the throat, finding it difficult to retain the grasp, but very dangerous to let go. *Germany*, like America, has no ambition for Eastern rule,—the consolidation of her empire is sufficient occupation. Another plan has been proposed, on the Anglo-Indian model, to pension off the Sultan, leaving him as the great Mogul was left in Delhi, with all the paraphernalia and pomp of a sovereign, but superseding him gradually by a more enlightened administration—leaving him as the Pope is in Rome, but making Constantinople a free city, under the joint protection of the

European Powers, as Belgium is;—but the cases of the Black Sea and Cracow show that neutralization is a very difficult thing amid rival Powers. The last candidate is *Russia*, whose tendencies are to the sunny south and eastward slope, away from foggy St. Petersburg; her extension in the Caucasus and on the Persian frontier places her geographically as the nearest neighbour to Turkey.

5. Supposing that, with the concurrence of England, France, and the Northern Powers, Asia Minor comes under Russian rule, would not this, like any European rule, be a blessing to the millions in those regions so long desolated by Turkish barbarism? Would not the desert rejoice and blossom as the rose? Russia itself, with all its shortcomings, has made great strides in reform during the present reign, and more are in progress. Would not that civilization which is turning the Crimea into a garden, and has planted the fair city of Odessa in localities last century overrun by Tartar hordes, be extended to the south of the Black Sea; and would not Asia Minor's great resources be developed by railroads, canals, and all the machinery of civilized life which is changing the face of Russia itself, where we see that, notwithstanding the Protective system, England carries on a good trade with Odessa and Petersburg? Would not the Christians of Turkey be placed in a higher position, and Turkish intolerance be suppressed, by the temporal power and pride of the Moslem being fully broken?

6. Asia Minor must fall to the lot of some European Power; and what Power but Russia is in the position to take the helm? What a field is presented in 673,000 square miles of some of the finest land in the world with harbours on three seas, mighty rivers and ports both on eastern and western waters, mines of iron, lead, copper, and silver in abundance; and a soil capable of producing any quantity of grain and cotton! Regions renowned in story are now given over, under the Turks, to miasma and wild beasts, and the peasantry are abandoned to starvation.

But whatever effects the occupation of Asia Minor by Russia may have on the inhabitants of Turkey, the question for England is, how would it affect British India?

(a.) Would it have much disturbing influence on the 40,000,000 Moslems in India, and the 200,000,000 other Natives?

(b.) Would it give more prestige and support to that army which is now Russianizing Central Asia, and threatening the Indian frontier?

(c.) Would it affect England's position with regard to the Suez Canal and the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway extension through Asia Minor?

RUSSIA'S OCCUPATION OF TURKEY AS AFFECTING THE MOSLEMS  
IN INDIA.

7. The effect on England's prestige in the East would be very different according as Asia Minor was occupied by Russia with or without the concurrence of England. With the former there would be no loss of prestige. People talk of the effect on the Mahomedans of India by England being the ally of Turkey, but it certainly was not seen in the Mutiny, when our bitterest foes were the Moslems; and nothing excited more ridicule against England among the Natives of India than when they heard that a ball was given in London to the Sultan, at the expense of the people of India, in order forsooth to conciliate the Mussulmans of India. When the fall of the Sultan comes it will have as little effect in India as the fall of the Pope's temporal power had in America. Ignorance and sectarian bitterness isolate the Indian Moslems from the Turks; besides, the different sects of Mahomedans in the East hate each other cordially, as we see with the Shiah and Suni, and are as bitterly antagonistic as Protestant and Papist in Europe. The other 200,000,000 Natives of India are too much occupied in their own concerns to be affected by a country so distant from them as Asia Minor, whereas it is from Central Asia that Russia's prestige penetrates into India, and which impresses on the Natives of India a profound awe of the Russ. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico.* The buzz of the bazaar indicates a constant expectation of the advent to India of the men that have knocked down the Khanats as ninepins.

8. Moslem pride and fanaticism have ever proved in India the strongest barriers against the advancement of European civilization, and while England has done much to raise the Hindus, the Moslems have hitherto proved a wall of brass; any unfavourable news arriving of the further fall of the Crescent at the hand of the Christian Kafir may tend to lower that pride and teach them that the days of Amurath and Arangzeb are passed away for ever. There is much truth in the remark General Kauffmann made to me at St. Petersburg in reference to the Central Asian Moslems: "Their pride must first be humbled before the light of Christianity and civilization can penetrate." The crumbling of Moslem power in Constantinople, Ispahan, Delhi, and Samarkand are signs of the times to the Indian Moslem, who is gradually learning that the pride of six centuries of conquest is levelled in the dust, that the Sultan who bears the title of Amir-al-Momenim is being shorn of all his power, and that the shadow of the Kaliphate is going down, as the shadow of the Great Mogul has gone down in Delhi. There is an apparent revival, but it is only the flare of the candle before

it goes out. The light is beginning to break on the intelligent class of Natives in India, indicating to them that though Russia and England may differ on certain lines of policy, yet that in putting down feudalism, princely oppression, and the insolent claims of the Moslem, they go hand in hand.

#### RUSSIA'S OCCUPATION OF TURKEY AS AFFECTING CENTRAL ASIA.

9. The point I wish to submit is, Is not Russia now like a mighty stream whose waters you cannot easily dam up, but you may partially divert them into another channel? In other words, the stream of Russian development and conquest flows at present in a Central Asia direction, is dashing up against our Indian frontier, and undermining its bulwarks, which are weak.\* If that stream be turned partly into another channel, its natural one—viz., Asia Minor—you are saved from great evils to both Empires, or, at least, of two evils you choose the lesser: there is less likelihood of collision from Russia's developing herself in Asia Minor than in Central Asia. Is it not safer for England to have Russia in force on the Mediterranean, than on the Hindu Kush and frontiers of Afghanistan? In the former case she confers a benefit on humanity, in the latter she would suspend much of England's civilizing work in the land of India, and would attack her in a position where she might have no allies, and where her navy could afford no help at the base of the Himalayas; in the former field Russia has plenty of scope, a "wide sea berth," in the latter she is involved in intrigues and miserable disputes. The case of Abraham and Lot applies to Empires also; full occupation prevents intrigue. Unless a safety valve is opened the pent-up vapours might find a dangerous mode of escape.†

\* The advance of Russia in Central Asia is generally admitted to be a boon to humanity, but those optimists who think there is no danger in the position in which Russia is now placed with regard to British India, ought to weigh the following observation as one among many: "The English Ambassador at St. Petersburg said, in 1869, to the Russian Government, 'Were Russian troops to enter Afghanistan, or the provinces contiguous of India, a cry for defensive measures, which would find an echo in every town in England, might excite public opinion to a degree which would force the English Government into a policy of antagonism to Russia which it is their anxious desire to avoid.'" Such works as Trench on "Central Asia," Vambéry's "Central Asia and its Frontiers," Stumm's "Russia's Advance Eastward," Ferrier's "Afghanistan," and Sir H. Rawlinson's "England and Russia in the East," prove that, in case of war, a strong array of Russian bayonets might appear on the Indian frontiers.

† Lord Dunsany, in an able work, "The Gaul and the Teuton," remarks on this subject: "In 1854 the eyes of Russia were turned to the West and her back to India. Repulsed in the West, she turned to the East, and a very short space now separates her advanced posts from our East Indian frontiers. Had we failed in the Crimean war, and Russia been successful in her designs on Turke



10. There are two great currents of Russian extension—one on the south towards Turkey, gradually widening and deepening since the days of Catherine ; the other, with two branches, rushes on, one south-east towards Persia, the other east towards China, dashing in its way along our Indian frontier. This current has, as an affluent, 150,000 men, the army of the Caucasus, designed as an army of reserve for Turkistan, which would require a strong Indian embankment to resist it directly ; but, as Sir H. Rawlinson said, “you cannot resist Russian encroachments, but “you can parry the blow and divert it.”\*

Russia is a great military Power, which in a few years will be backed by 3,000,000 bayonets. The advances it has made from the Caspian during the last fifteen years show what it is capable of the next fifteen. Khiva went lately ; Kokand is gone ; and Kashgar, a barrier to Russia's onward move towards China, and a focus for Moslem raids against Russia, will probably be the next to go down the stream. This will bring Russia close to Kashmir and Kabul ; within the next ten years a railway will be completed from Russia to Tashkend, and another line will be opened from Russia to Tehran, from which latter place extensions can be easily made to Herat ; while a railway from Russia to India itself will ere long be carried through.

11. What is the Indian embankment that is to stay this current? Only 60,000 European troops for the whole of India (240,000,000). While there is much loyalty and content among many of the people, yet let us not shut our eyes to the following points: We have against us—“a seething, “fermenting, festering mass of Mussulman hostility,” 40,000,000 in number, for whose moral and material improvement England has done little ;—the military and priestly class, Hindu or Mahomedan,—those Native Chiefs whom we have justly deposed for their oppressions of their subjects ;—the mob and “the blackguardism” of the population are our foes ; while our European agents are becoming less adapted to and less influential over the masses. We can hold on even under these conditions, but active antagonism to Russia means raising the European army in India to 100,000 men, to be maintained by increased taxes, which signify increased discontent and the consequent withdrawing funds from the development of the country.

12. It is easy work for Englishmen in their island home, fenced in by the sea, to have had far too much occupation in Europe to have made progress in Central Asia. Success was on our side, and upon the road by which, if at all, Russia must invade India, her advance has been immense, and, what is more, well secured.”

\* See on this Rawlinson's “Russia and India in the East.”

the ocean and defended by Volunteers, to talk of repressing Russia ; but it is a very different thing in India to meet a powerful military nation on the frontiers, with tens of thousands of enemies ready to start up behind on any favourable opportunity. [What a shameful sight would be exhibited to the Heathen of two Christian Empires wasting on internecine strife the resources they need so urgently for working out the material and moral improvement of the East !]

13. The Central Asia, Indian, and Turkish Questions are, then, closely connected together in this respect, inasmuch as the former is used by Russia as a leverage to ease England's action against her in Turkey, or, as a Russian journal states it: "The diplomatic controversy is transferred from the banks of the Bosphorus to the slopes of Peshawur." A St. Petersburg paper refers to the conquest of Khiva in the following words: "A second route has been opened out to India, and England is put face to face with us, no longer at Constantinople, but on the northern slopes of the Peshawur mountain range." India is the Achilles' heel, where England is most vulnerable, though some have fancied the Russian march towards India could be stayed by neutral zones or embassies. Must not the solution of the Central Asia Question be sought not at Calcutta, but at Constantinople—not from General Kauffmann, but from General Ignatieff ?

14. Russia has made *very* rapid advances in Central Asia, Khiva has been annexed, Kokand has just been incorporated with Russian territory, and Kashgar, which is a barrier to Russia's onward movement towards China and an obstacle to her supremacy in Central Asia, must so follow in the track of that semi-Oriental empire whose slope is to the East. With the annexation of Kashgar, Russia will be brought to the frontiers of Kashmir and Afghanistan. This, with the advance in the direction of Herat, and with Persia, as Sir H. Rawlinson admits, a mere instrument in Russia's hand, will require the greatest forbearance on both sides to prevent a contact becoming a collision, that would be a deadly blow to the cause of Christian civilization in Asia. The sentiment of Gregorief, late Governor of Western Siberia, on this point is a noble one: "It would be derogatory to the dignity of two great nations like England and Russia to engage in a contest of petty intrigue, or to strive at mutual injury by exciting and fostering revolt among each other's subjects." May not the safest way, however, of meeting this exigency be by easing the pressure, and by not interfering with Russia's current flowing towards Asia Minor, thereby lessening the strength of that dashing on the Indian frontiers? Central Asia, with its population not much larger than that of London, with their wants few and mode of life

simple, does not afford sufficient scope for the energies of a growing Empire like that of Russia.\*

#### RUSSIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE.

15. Mr. Farley, in his excellent and candid work, "The Decline of Turkey," proposes that Constantinople should be a free city, under the joint protection of the European Powers, its municipal matters being managed by deputies elected by a Company like the old East India Company, composed of the holders of stock and foreign creditors of Turkey. Others have proposed joining Roumania with Constantinople as a neutral State—like Belgium; and one writer has advocated the giving Constantinople to the Duke of Edinburgh, as son of the Queen of England and son-in-law of the Emperor of Russia. Neutralizations are desirable but difficult things, as the neutralization of the Black Sea and of Cracow a free city show; but should the Canal of Suez and the Bosphorus be neutralized, it would be a great benefit to international communication, as the Bosphorus may hereafter become a channel for the trade of Central Asia and Central China, as it was in the Middle Ages, before Turkish rule swept like a simoom over all trade and civilization. It may be to Central Europe in a degree what the Canal of Suez is to South Europe. But who will hold the keys of each in such a case? is a question for the future.

16. One great difficulty in the peaceable solution of the Eastern Question and in the occupation of Asia Minor by an European Power lies in who shall occupy Constantinople. Though the Queen of the Bosphorus has been looked upon as another Gibraltar, and Napoleon the First pronounced that the master of Constantinople would be the master of the world, yet it may be a question whether the real military power of Russia, rapidly developing in the Black Sea since

\* On this subject we give a quotation from a very able pamphlet, "L'Impasse Orientale," by Baron Charles, Bruxelles, 1871—a man evidently behind the scenes. He says: "Those who have lived in intimacy with Russian diplomatists know perfectly well that Russia dreams not of the conquest of India, but her commanding position (in Central Asia) gives her the means of exercising, under certain circumstances, a pressure very menacing for English rule in India. If a war broke out between Russia and England, Russia could very easily lead the Khanats of Central Asia, Persia, and even the Afghans into a campaign against India, not to conquer, but to revolutionize it, and in this manner to paralyze the English force which ought to defend Constantinople." Many other passages could be quoted, showing that there is a policy which means the extrusion of Russia from Turkey is her intrusion into India. I am no Russophobic, but the optimist view which, ostrich-like, hides its head and says there is no danger, is equally mistaken. Our motto should be "Defence, not defiance; watchful, not suspicious."

the abrogation of the Black Sea Treaty, would be greatly increased by the mere possession of Constantinople. Russia could have at her command in the Black Sea eighty ships of the Russian Steam Navigation Company, which can be armed, and all whose officers belong to her Navy; and in a restored Sebastopol connected last year with the Russian network of railways, she can accumulate any number of troops within thirty hours' sail of Constantinople, which could take the forts of the Bosphorus in reverse, while in Nikolaief she has another Portsmouth. Her railway connecting the Caucasus with South Russia is now finished, so that she could mass 100,000 troops at Sebastopol, facing Constantinople.

17. But, on the other hand, while the popular feeling and historical recollections of Russia are in favour of supplanting the Crescent by the Cross in Constantinople, some of her ablest men doubt whether it would be for Russia's interests to occupy the city. They know well the jealous feeling it would excite in Austria, Germany, and England; but, above all, they fear its tendency to break up the Empire by giving it another centre than St. Petersburg. On this we quote the opinion of Gurowski, a Russian author, who, though he looks on the occupation of Constantinople by Russia as her 'manifest destiny,' yet states the following as the probable result:—

"The monarch and his grandees will yield to the temptation. They will abandon the cold, misty, frozen, marshy, mouldy, and gloomy region of St. Petersburg, with its monuments of murder and of parricide, for the unrivalled beauty of the Bosphorus, where, in their ambitious intoxication, they will believe themselves the masters of the world. But history attests that to conquer and occupy Byzantium is to sink into effeminacy. . . . The Greeks, the Fanariote, the Slavic Rajah of the South, will soon prevail in the palace—it may be in the modern seraglio—against the genuine Russian. By-and-by they will surround the master, creep into his councils, and crowd out therefrom the man of the North. Even the cunning and servile German, so influential now in the northern capital, will be pushed aside. . . . In one word, the court in Byzantium or Czarigrad will soon cease to be Russian; it will become estranged to the nation, and autocracy will soon become disabled. It will lose its control over the people, its old indigenous flavour will disappear, the historic ties between the Czar and his subjects will be rent asunder; the man of the North will cease to recognize his hereditary master in the despot revelling on the Hellespont. . . . A great mart will be opened, not only for the exchange of goods, but likewise for that of ideas. Through Constantinople the Russian people will mix freely, not only with the few foreign merchants and speculators visiting or established in St. Petersburg, but with the world at large. This broad opening for commerce will, like a pioneer, carve the way for other and more bright results. Nowhere will commerce prove to such an extent a mediator of civilization as when Constantinople shall initiate the Russian people to the trade of the world. All the forces and resources of the country will turn naturally towards the south, following the lordly currents of the Dnieper, the Don, the Wolga, and its affluents. Now, during six months of the year the Baltic is frozen, but the communication through Constantinople will know no interruption. . . .

Western ideas and culture will make their way, and irresistibly stimulate the whole empire. What is now benumbed will be raised to elasticity and to cosmopolite intercourse. Odessa is already one of the most liberal and facile spots in Russia, where despotism is felt less painfully. Intercourse on a large scale with other nations will result, and the Russian, the man of the people, will no more be kept, as now, isolated from his brethren. His suspicion against everything foreign—a sentiment carefully fostered and nourished by the Government—his sulky coyness, will successively melt away and disappear: the inborn sociality of his character will prevail, rendering him generously friendly with the foreigners."

18. Would not Russia, however, at Constantinople be a constant source of jealousy to Austria and Germany in relation to the Slavonic Provinces and the Danubian Valley? The German people like the Russians as little as they do the French; while the Russians look on the Germans as "sausage-makers, dummies," as the men who, like Scotchmen in the colonies, monopolize all the good things of Russia, and have striven to denationalize their country. There is a Russian proverb expressing the popular feeling:—

"The German may be a good fellow, still it is better to hang him."

#### RUSSIA IN TURKEY WOULD BE ANTAGONISTIC TO AUSTRIA.

19. Russia already feels the heavy expense Central Asia is to her, and few compensations are to be expected from countries so poor in population and so undeveloped, though they are a stepping-stone in her trade route to China along the borders of Kashgar. Asia Minor, on the other hand, will afford her a far finer and richer field, and full occupation not only in the country itself, but from the complications that may arise with Austria and Germany.

20. Austria can no more agree permanently with Russia on the question of the Danubian Provinces than she could with Prussia on the hegemony of Germany. The Slavs in the Danubian Provinces dislike Austria as much as they do Germany; and though they sympathize with Russia in religion, race, and language, yet they have a wholesome dread of being under the Russian tchinovik or bureaucracy; they do not forget the history of Slav Poland; they would be glad to use Russia as a means of throwing off the Turkish yoke, but they wish to be as independent of Russia as of Austria.

Austria, ruling over a population the majority of which are Slavs, must view with jealousy a Power like Russia—Pan-Slav in its tendencies, with 50,000,000 Slavs in her empire—the drift of whose policy must be to rear up a great Pan-Slav empire, which might drag into its circle the Slavs of Austria—14,000,000 in number—who, repelled since 1867 by Count Beust's chilling dualism, see Russia as the only beacon for them, though they would prefer independence of Russia if they could be secured against

the rough Germans and ruder Hungarians ; yet, failing this, the Slavs of Austria and of the Danube see Russia as the only barrier against German absorption, and they hope that when Russia gets free from her German bureaucracy they may fit into a decentralized administration.

General Fadeef, of the Russian Army, in his able pamphlet on the Eastern Question, translated from the Russian, in 1871, gives some very good examples of the antagonism of Russia and Austria.\* We give a few extracts : “ In two questions of vital importance to Russia—the Eastern “ and the Polish—Austria can be both the shield and the weapon of “ the hostile part of Europe. . . . It is in Austria’s power to push “ the force of a European coalition against Russia’s western frontier. “ . . . She can open a road to the Vistula by revolutionizing Poland, “ as she threatened to do in 1856. . . . It would be an act of sui- “ cide on the part of Austria to consent to the solution of the Eastern “ Question in a Russian sense. How can it be expected that she will “ consent to the creation along her southern boundary of a Slavonian “ Piedmont, which, from its homogeneity, would carry dissolution not “ only into one corner of the possession, but into the very body of the “ empire ? ”

RUSSIA IN TURKEY WOULD BE AN OBJECT OF JEALOUSY TO GERMANY.

21. Dynastic unions are not permanent. In the last Franco-German War the Czar was on the side of Germany, but the sympathies of his people were with France ; the Russian people dislike the Germans very much, and this is reciprocated. Germany has little sympathy with the Slav language, literature, or races, whether in Poland, in Russia, or on the Danube. An anecdote will illustrate this : When Frederick the Great heard that the rural population of Pomerania still spoke Slavonian, he ordered *an end to be put to such a disgrace*, and the *disgrace* no longer existed towards the end of his reign. Various German writers have invited the Slavs “ to disappear from the face of the earth, history having “ provided no corner for them.” The Slavs see the fate of their race in German Poland, where the German is as irreconcilable to the Slav as the Saxon in Europe is to the Celt.

The Germans would scarcely view calmly the mouths of the Danube and the Bosphorus passing into the hands of Russia, as the Danube, with its 100 tributaries and 1,400 miles of length, is the commercial heart of Central Europe, draining 14,000 square miles of territory, joining Germany, Turkey, and Austria. In the Middle Ages the Danube was the highway of commerce between the East and Central Europe, Constantinople being the grand *dépôt* for distribution. Will Germany let

\* “ Fadeef’s Opinion on the Eastern Question.” London : Stanford. 1871.

the mouth of this be in the hands of a foreigner? Germany has an interest with England in maintaining the balance of power in Europe, especially in relation to France and Russia.

#### RUSSIA IN TURKEY AND THE SUEZ CANAL.

22. The recent firm measure of the British Government in so promptly purchasing the Khédive's shares in the Suez Canal has indicated that England has felt the time has come when her Eastern policy should not be left to drift like a ship without chart or compass among quicksands with breakers ahead. It has called forth an unanimous opinion, indicating the hold India and its artery to England, the Suez Canal, have even on the insular mind; it indicates that England is throwing off her shopkeeping policy and is adopting an Imperial one, which has the federation of the Empire as its aim, and that she is determined not to be reduced to the condition of a second Holland. It signifies also a policy of defence, not defiance. As Lesseps has stated: "The English occupation of the Canal is a guarantee for the peace of the whole world." We trust it may forecast a further line of action, now that we have secured our water-way to India, not to meddle and muddle with the Sick Man's inheritance—simply let it alone.

23. The third point is, How would the occupation of Asia Minor by Russia command the Suez Canal? To consolidate her position in Asia Minor would take half a century. Ere that period elapses, may not Russia's torrent of conquests be weakened by diffusion, as ours is in India? Nations, after a period, find that extension of territory is not only very expensive, but a weakness. Even taking the extreme view, that Russia became strong in the Mediterranean, would it not be easier for England to meet Russia in the Mediterranean than on her Indian frontier? There would be England's fleet in the Mediterranean, besides her command of Malta, Gibraltar, and the watchful jealousy of other Powers who have an interest in securing the neutralization of the Canal. As respects the command of the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway by Russia, she can control that without holding Asia Minor; but in time of war, England has the Suez Canal route as an alternative, and in time of peace it would be Russia's interest to protect it as she does the telegraph lines. Russia's line of communication will be, ere long, with the North of India by her Central Asia Railway, one branch of which is being made from Russia to Tehran, and may be extended to Herat; the other may run along the Northern Indian frontier. The rail will serve Russia in the North as a short cut to Eastern Asia, as the Canal of Suez serves England in the South of Asia.

#### THE RELATIONS OF RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

24. The tone both of the English and Russian Press on the Eastern

Question has been moderate. England has lost much of her Russophobia; and Russia, who in 1833 claimed the *sole* protectorate of the Christians, now seems disposed to work *jointly* in the same line with Germany and Austria, at the same time inviting the co-operation of the Powers, signatories of the Treaty of Paris.

The English Press, watchful but not suspicious, is accepting as a fact a great Russo-Asiatic Empire, that *may* extend through Northern China and develop south to the shores of the Persian Gulf, rivalling in extent our Anglo-Indian one, and running conterminous with it north and south—an empire that may surpass that of Alexander; the hope is that these two empires may run parallel without intersecting each other, each having its distinct, independent interests—different, though not necessarily clashing. The East formerly meant Turkey and Mahomedanism; it now means Russia and England—Pan-Slavism and Anglo-Saxonism,—and peasants' rights, the common aim of both.

To no two empires in the world and their subjects is the importance more apparent of a good understanding than to those of England and Russia, for much of the civilizing work of England in India and of Russia at home and in Central Asia would be undone by hostilities. Eastern Native dynasties are mouldering in the dust: are their mischievous energies, like those of the Turks, to be still kept up by the rivalries of Christian Powers?

25. The issue, however, comes to this: If England opposes the Russian advance in Turkey, Russia will checkmate her by a policy in Central Asia, disturbing to the position and prestige of England in India. She has a leverage here, which will be very strong when her railway lines towards the Indian frontier shall be completed—a work that may be finished within the next ten years, restoring the old trade route between Central Europe, Central Asia, North China, and North India; and where goods go troops can proceed.

26. As a sign of the times, a remarkable article appeared in the *Quarterly Review* for October, 1874—"Provincial Turkey"—written evidently by one acquainted with the country, who begins by a quotation from Admiral Slade: "Although, in the opinion of some, it matters little to England whether an Othman, a Romanoff, or a Hapsburg rule on the banks of the Bosphorus, it does, in the opinion of all, concern her much whether a Turk or a Frank rule in the Valley of the Nile."

We quote the view of the *Quarterly* on this subject; it finds an echo in the hearts of many\* :—

"When that hour comes, let the Ottoman Empire fare as it may, England's policy is clearly traced out for her beforehand by the exigencies of her own great

\* See in a late number of *Fraser's Magazine* an article on "Turkey," in which



empire. To Russia, mistress of the Central Asiatic line, belong of necessity the destinies of Northern Turkey : they are already in her hands. Her Asiatic policy, long consistent throughout, now draws to completion. One foot planted on the Amoor boundary line to the east, and the other on the Caucasian Isthmus to the west, she has gathered up in her unrelaxing grasp the two extremities of the great Tartar route ; her latest campaigns have cleared away the obstacles interposed midway ; while, by her celebrated note of October, 1870, she demanded, and by the Conference of January, 1871, obtained, that the key of the whole mid-Asian system, the Black Sea itself, should be placed henceforth within the reach of her hands, ready to wrench it, whenever the hour strikes in the councils of St. Petersburg, from the feeble grasp of the Osmanlee, and to make it all her own. That she will, sooner or later, thus wrench it ; that the Russian flag will float supreme over every port on the Black Sea coast ; that it will even one day wave in sovereignty from the towers of Galata and the Seraskierat,—is scarcely less certain than that the sun once risen in the east will move onward to its place in the western heavens ; a wonder-working Joshua may perhaps delay, but cannot reverse its course.

“ What Russia is to Central, that are we to Southern Asia ; it is our inheritance, the reward of our consistency in act, if not in purpose. We, too, have almost reached the goal ; and the very events that will ultimately award the Black Sea to our northerly ally, will, we can hardly doubt, decide for us also into whose hands the key of our choicest possession, the Southern Asiatic route, will fall. For, once again, what the Black Sea is to Russia, that to us are the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. From Muscat to Yokohama the Indo-Chinese line is ours : the completion of that line, its last, and because its last its most important, connecting link is formed by the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. To these shores must all our attention—as much, at least, as we can spare from disestablishing Churches and marrying our sisters-in-law—be directed, when the Crescent vanishes from them in its last eclipse ; and unpardonable indeed will be our weakness, our negligence, or our folly, if a single harbour, a single roadstead along their extent, acknowledge in that day any sovereignty but our own ; if not in our name, at least in that of a supple instrument or a docile vassal.”

#### CONCLUSION.

I have thus glanced in a very brief way over the various topics of this very comprehensive, pressing, and practical subject. I will now conclude with a summary of the chief points at issue, and the problems to be worked out by discussion.

(1.) The principle of *non-intervention* with Continental politics has been of eminent advantage to England at home and abroad. Is not such a policy also applicable in relation to the probable occupation or control, sooner or later, of Turkey by one or more of the Northern Powers ?

(2.) England having secured her Indian interests, in case of any eventualities in Turkey, by purchasing the Khédive's shares in the Suez Canal, do the interests of India require any intervention to prevent the occupation or control of Turkey by any of the Northern Powers ?

he argues Asia Minor can only be raised by an European Power, and that Power Russia : “ It will be a good thing for Turkey, and no harm to the world, when the long-meditated conquest is completed.”

(3.) Would not England's intervention have the following evil effects: Producing unfriendly relations with Russia, so detrimental to India. The two Powers, England and Russia, are now neighbours in Central Asia, and hostile feelings arising from the Turkish Question might lead to collisions dangerous to the interests of the two Empires and the civilization of Asia under the guardianship of both.


(4.) Would not the antagonism of England and Russia in Turkey mean antagonism on the Indian frontier also? The disputes on the Bosphorus would extend to India, near whose frontiers Russia now is; and one of the causes that impel Russia on is to checkmate England "by transferring the diplomatic quarrel from the banks of the Bosphorus to the slopes of Peshawur." Does not English interference with Russia in Turkey mean, therefore, Russian interference with England in India?

(5.) Some European Power may, sooner or later, occupy or control Asia Minor. Should Russia, with the consent of the other Powers, do so, would it not contribute to the happiness of the Christian population, the development of the resources of that vast country once so fertile and cultivated?

(6.) Is not Russia a mighty, rising Empire, requiring expansion? Asia Minor would afford for many years a field to task her energies, without bringing her into collision with England, as she is in danger now of doing in the narrow field and barren localities of Central Asia, where the torrent flows undivided; whereas, partially diverted to Asia Minor, it would be weakened, and would gradually diffuse itself in a fertilizing stream.

(7.) Would not Russia in Asia Minor be watched by the jealous Empires of Austria and Germany? and would not the gradual effect in Russia itself of the possession of Constantinople be to displace the centre of power at St. Petersburg, leading to a decentralized system which would give more moral but less military weight?





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